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In the rubber hand illusion tactile stimulation seen on a rubber hand, that is 
synchronous with tactile stimulation felt on the hidden real hand, can lead to an 
illusion of ownership over the rubber hand. This illusion has been shown to produce a 
temperature decrease in the hidden hand, suggesting that such illusory ownership 
produces disownership of the real hand. Here we apply immersive virtual reality (VR) 
to experimentally investigate this with respect to sensitivity to temperature change. 
Forty participants experienced immersion in a VR with a virtual body (VB) seen from 
a first person perspective. For half the participants the VB was consistent in posture 
and movement with their own body, and in the other half there was inconsistency.  
Temperature sensitivity on the palm of the hand was measured before and during the 
virtual experience. The results show that temperature sensitivity decreased in the 
consistent compared to the inconsistent condition. Moreover, the change in sensitivity 
was significantly correlated with the subjective illusion of virtual arm ownership but 
modulated by the illusion of ownership over the full virtual body. This suggests that a 
full body ownership illusion results in a unification of the virtual and real bodies into 
one overall entity - with proprioception and tactile sensations on the real body 
integrated with the visual presence of the virtual body. The results are interpreted in 
the framework of a ‘body matrix’ recently introduced into the literature.   	  
Keywords: Body ownership; body representation; virtual reality; virtual 
environments; temperature sensitivity threshold; rubber hand illusion; skin 
temperature cooling. 
	  
1.	  INTRODUCTION	  	  
The question of ‘who am I?’ is a fundamental one in philosophy, and is intimately 
tied up with the relationship between our ‘self’, our consciousness, and the body in 
which the self and consciousness are intertwined (1). From a common sense point of 
view our body seems to be a relatively stable entity - we look in the mirror every day, 
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and see reflected back the same body which signifies the same ‘self’. The body does 
change through time, but imperceptibly. The idea that our body may be trivially 
mutable seems counter intuitive. Yet since the publication of a one page paper in 
Nature by Botvinick and Cohen in 1998 (2) showing that it is extremely simple to 
generate in people the illusion that a rubber arm is part of their body, there has been 
renewed and significantly growing interest in the study of the brain’s body 
representation.  
The rubber hand illusion (RHI) described in (2), and earlier work such as (3),  
therefore suggest that the brain’s body representation is highly plastic, with the 
possibility of rapid illusory incorporation of fake or virtual body parts, and even 
illusory attribution of a surrogate whole body as the own body (4-6). These results 
have also been shown to operate also with body surrogates presented in virtual reality 
(VR) (7-12). In all cases, the illusion of body part or full body ownership is induced 
by multimodal stimulation. This is typically achieved through visuotactile stimulation 
where the surrogate limb (or body) is seen to be tapped and stroked, while the tactile 
stimulation is applied synchronously in time and with correct location on the real 
body which is visually obscured. It has also been shown to be induced through 
visuomotor rather than visuotactile synchronous stimulation (13, 14).  A critical factor 
is that the surrogate body be seen by the participant from a first-person perspective 
(1PP) with respect to the eye position of that body, and where the body apparently 
visually substitutes the real body (9, 12, 15).  
These illusions do not operate only subjectively but cause observable 
physiological responses. When the surrogate limb such as the rubber hand or full 
body is threatened there is a significant arousal or stress response (6, 9, 16). It has also 
been shown that illusory ownership has strong links with the homeostatic system. For 
example, in (17) it was shown that the RHI provokes a temperature reduction of the 
corresponding real hand, but not of other parts of the body. This has also been 
extended to the full body illusion with the body seen from third person perspective 
(18). The converse also seems to be the case: reducing limb temperature can modulate 
the intensity of the rubber hand illusion (19).  
In this paper we report an experiment that extends the range of observable 
physical phenomena associated with the whole body illusion. We wondered whether a 
full body ownership illusion would result in a type of neglect of physical events on 
the real body - in particular whether there would be any change in sensitivity of 
participants to small changes in temperature of a device applied to the hand. We 
expected, akin to cooling of the real hand in the RHI, that a strong illusion of 
ownership of a full virtual body would lead to a reduction in sensitivity to temperature 
changes, thus supporting the idea that ownership of a virtual body implies some 
neglect of the real body. However, the results suggested the opposite - that a full body 
ownership illusion results in the unification of virtual and real body without such 
neglect. Nevertheless a weak illusion of full virtual body ownership but combined 
with a stronger illusion of ownership of the virtual hand is associated with lesser 
sensitivity to temperature changes of the real hand. We consider the results in the 
context of the idea of a ‘body matrix’ introduced in (20). 
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2.	  METHODS	  	  
2.1	  Overview	  of	  the	  Experimental	  Scenario	  
 
The participants’ real bodies were substituted by a virtual body as seen through a 
head-tracked stereo wide field-of-view head-mounted display (HMD) (Figure 2). 
They could see the virtual body directly when looking down towards themselves and 
also as reflected in a virtual mirror. The body was either in a posture consistent with 
that of the real body and with the virtual right arm movements temporally and 
spatially synchronous with real right arm movements (consistent condition), or 
alternatively in an unusual posture, not consistent with the real one, and with spatial 
position and movements of the virtual right arm inconsistent with those of their real 
right arm (non-consistent condition). The temperature sensitivity threshold of 
participants was measured before they entered the virtual reality, and immediately 
after they had experienced the virtual embodiment in one of the two conditions. Once 
they had experienced one condition and answered a questionnaire, they were exposed 
to the second one, where the procedures were repeated. 	  
2.2	  Equipment	  	  
The head-mounted display used was an NVIS SX111 with a resolution of 1280×1024 
and a Field of View (FOV) of 76ºH×64ºV per eye with overall resolution 2560×1024 
and an overall FOV of 111ºH×64ºV. It has a 60Hz display refresh rate. The virtual 
environment was programmed on a PC with graphics card GeForce 480GTX. Head-
tracking was achieved with the 6-DOF Intersense IS-900 device. Additionally the 
right hand of the participants was tracked using the Optitrack optical tracking system1. 
An optical marker was put on the back of the participant’s right hand, which was used 
for position and orientation tracking. 
Temperature sensitivity threshold  (TST) was obtained with a CASE (Computer 
Aided Sensory Evaluator) IV Thermal stimulator (Figure 1a). This consists of a 
thermoelectric unit which has a linear ramp of cooling and warming of 4°/second. The 
device was placed on the floor to the right of the participants and they were required 
to position the palmar of their right hand on the measuring device.  During the 
recording periods, depending on the condition, participants would see or not their 
virtual hand resting on the virtual counterpart of the device. The device first adjusts to 
the temperature of the hand of the participants, and then 20 readings are taken at 
different temperature values. At each reading the participant was required to say 
whether he felt any temperature change or not. The computer program associated with 
the device then computed the threshold temperature in degrees celcius (21). 
It should be noted that since TST measures the threshold at which there is a just 
noticeable difference in temperature, higher values of TST imply lower temperature 
sensitivity.  	  
2.3	  Experimental	  Design	  	  
The experiment was designed as a within groups experiment where each participant 
experienced the two conditions mentioned above - referred to as the Consistent 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  http://www.naturalpoint.com/optitrack/	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Condition (C) and the Non-Consistent Condition (N). In the C condition the virtual 
body was in a normal seated posture with the left hand hanging down the side and 
where the right hand and arm moved synchronously in time and space with the real 
counterparts.  In the N condition the body was also seated but remained throughout 
the experiment in an unusual posture and the right arm movements were not the same 
as the movements of the real right arm (hence the virtual arm was also displaced from 
the real arm). The participant would see the virtual arm move as soon as he moved his 
actual arm, but the movements would differ. Earlier pilot experiments had shown that 
it was quite difficult to find a condition where participants did not have the illusion of 
ownership over the collocated virtual body experienced from 1PP. We examined 
many different possibilities until we found that the ownership illusion tended to 
diminish with both non-synchronous arm movement and non-consistent body posture.   
Forty male participants were recruited from around the university campus, and 
assigned arbitrarily to one of the two groups: Non-Consistent condition followed by 
Consistent condition (NC) or the opposite order (CN). Each group had the same 
number of participants.  The two conditions were presented in counter-balanced order.   
However, it turned out that there was a very strong asymmetry between these two 
groups with respect to their questionnaire responses and TST measures (see 
Electronic Supplementary Material), so treating this as a within-groups design was 
inappropriate. Hence for the purposes of analysis we have considered only the first 
exposures of each group, making this a between-groups design with 20 participants 
per group. We refer to the groups as N and C - the group that received the non-
consistent condition or consistent condition as their first exposure respectively, and 
results from the second exposure were discounted. 	  
2.4	  Participants	  	  
The mean age of participants was 23 ± 5 years with no significant difference between 
the two groups. The experiment was approved by the Ethics Committee of the 
University of Barcelona, and all participants gave their written informed consent to 
participate in the study. 	  
2.5	  Procedures	  	  
When participants arrived at the VR laboratory an outline of the procedures and 
experiment was explained to them, and they were asked to sign a consent form. The 
operator gave them a pullover to wear of the same colour as the one worn by the 
virtual body in the VR and then adhered the Optitrack marker on the dorsal area of 
their right hand. They were asked to move the hand to verify the marker was well 
fixed. Then, they were then invited to sit on a chair on which they remained 
throughout the experimental procedures.  
The procedures for the TST recording were explained to them. They were given a 
series of test trials in order to become used to the task and understand the 
requirements. The number of test trials was between 3 and 8, and the intensity 
changes were chosen by the operator. The training phase stopped once the participant 
recognized the stimuli, and gave at least one affirmative and one negative answer 
perceiving some stimuli. Then, 20 readings were then administered using an adaptive 
procedure (21). This resulted in the first TST reading that we denote as tReal. 
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Then the participants donned the HMD (which also housed the Intersense head-
tracker) with eyes closed and it was adjusted so that it was comfortable. When the 
participants opened their eyes they were in a virtual room of size 7.6 × 3.9 meters, and 
2.7 meters high with some furniture (Figure 2c). They were told to sit in a posture 
with their left hand hanging down at their side, their feet flat on the floor. There were 
told that they could move their right hand and head but no other part of their body. 
Then they were manoeuvred into the same posture as the virtual body and in 
particular the virtual right hand was carefully adjusted in order that its position and 
orientation was consistent with the real hand. In order that the participant would 
experience it to be in the same position as his real hand, the position of the virtual 
hand and also the virtual counterpart of the Case IV were adjusted. The position of 
their body with respect to the chair and the box was calibrated so that it appeared to 
be in the correct position from the point of view of each participant individually.  The 
tracking information available was the position and orientation of the hand, and 
therefore the rotation of the shoulder and both the position and rotation of the elbow 
were inferred with inverse kinematics.  
To acclimatise to the virtual environment and to confirm they could see correctly 
through the HMD, they were asked to look around and describe the scene they saw 
(Figure 2). One of the elements in this scene was a green box (representing the CASE 
IV) immediately to their right. Then they were asked to look down at themselves, and 
they would see a male virtual body substituting their own and seated on a virtual 
replicate of the chair (Figure 2a). The virtual body could also be seen as reflected in a 
virtual mirror. In addition, to avoid rejection of the virtual body because of it having a 
face different to that of the participant, the mirror was placed in such a way that the 
participant only saw the reflection from the neck down (Figure 2c).  
After the adjustment phase, the participant was asked to briefly close his eyes and 
the experiment was started, either in the N or in the C condition. Participants were 
encouraged to move their right arm, and they would see the arm and hand move both 
from a first person perspective and also as reflected in the mirror. Figure 3 contrasts 
the C and N conditions. In the C condition the movement of the virtual right hand was 
synchronous with the real hand, whereas in the N condition this was not the case, but 
instead the arm moved triggered by movements of the real arm but the movement was 
not the same as the movement of the real hand.  
To ensure that participants in the N condition did not feel a spatial congruency 
between their arm movements and the movements of the virtual arm and hand, three 
distortions were introduced. First, the update of the virtual hand position was delayed 
by 1 second. Second, to ensure that there was no congruency felt between the real and 
the virtual arm, the rotation of the virtual hand was not delayed but the x and y axes of 
rotations were swapped. This introduced movements that were still physically 
possible but, combined with the delayed position, prevented an identification with the 
real movements. Third, in order to reduce the probability of limb ownership due to 
some collocation of the real hand and the virtual one, when the physical hand 
approached within 40 cm of the Case IV box a progressive displacement was 
introduced in order that virtual hand deviated upwards and away from it. As a result, 
when the real hand was exactly at the initial position, on the Case IV, the virtual arm 
was extended upwards by 1.5m above the virtual counterpart of the Case IV. 
Over a period of 2 minutes participants were encouraged to move their hand in 
different ways: towards the left, the right, look at their palm, the back of their hand, 
and so on (Figure 2bc). They were also asked to look down at themselves and at the 
mirror. They were also encouraged to pay attention to the details of their virtual hand 
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such as the fingernails. In addition to this, at various moments they were asked to 
point to some of the objects in the scene they had previously described: for example, 
to point at a painting on the wall in front. They were asked to do this pointing task 3 
times during the 2 minutes. 
After this period they were asked to place their hand on the Case IV. In the C 
condition, the virtual hand followed. In the N condition, the virtual hand remained in 
a position above the Case IV.  Then there were another 20 sensitivity readings, 
resulting in the TST measure that we denote as tVR.  
After the completion of these readings participants were asked to close their eyes 
and also the screens were blanked, and they were asked a number of questions (see 
below). Then the experimental trial was repeated in the other condition where all 
procedures were the same. 
 
2.6	  The	  Questionnaire	  	  
There were 4 questions answered immediately following each of the two exposures, 
and while the participant was still wearing the HMD, as shown in Table 1. The scale 
and the questions were read out to the participants by the experimenter who noted 
down the answers. 
	  
2.7	  The	  TST	  Readings	  	  
Each participant completed the TST test before entering the virtual reality (tReal), and 
then in the virtual reality after the period of 2 mins (tVR). It should be noted again that 
greater values of tReal or tVR indicate less sensitivity to temperature changes. We 
define . When  there is less sensitivity to temperature 
changes in the virtual reality compared to physical reality. 	  
3.	  RESULTS	  	  
3.1	  Questionnaire	  Scores	  	  
Figure 4 shows the questionnaire scores. It is clear that the N and C conditions had the 
required effect, generally the scores are higher in the C condition than the N for Q1 
(own), Q2 (move) and Q4 (arm), and lower for Q3 (another).  
Comparison of the C scores with the corresponding N scores show that the 
differences between them for Q1, Q3 and Q4 are highly significant: Q1: P = 0.0002,  
Q2: P < 0.00005, Q4: P < 0.00005. For Q3 the difference has significance P < 0.11. 
All significance levels are two-sided, using the Wilcoxon rank-sum non-parametric 
test. 
The primary purpose of the C and N conditions was to find virtual body 
configurations that would provide a sufficient range of the degree of subjective body 
ownership, and this succeeded.  	  
3.2	  Temperature	  Sensitivity	  Threshold	  	  	  
Here we compare  between the N and C groups. The mean and standard errors for 
the two groups are N: -0.06 ± 0.10 and C: 0.29 ± 0.07. One way ANOVA shows that 
the means are significantly different at P = 0.007. However, inspection of the scatter 
Δt = tVR − tReal Δt > 0
Δt
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diagram of tVR on tReal shows possible heteroscedasticity (variance of tVR increasing 
with tReal) and the Shapiro-Wilk test for normality of the residuals is marginal (P = 
0.06). Figure 5(a) shows that this is resolved by working on a log scale. Let
Δ log t = log(tVR / tReal) , which has mean ± standard error N: 0.008 ± 0.102 and C: 
0.401 ± 0.095. ANOVA shows these to be significantly different (P = 0.008). The 
Shapiro-Wilks test for normality of the residuals has P > 0.8. (See also Electronic 
Supplementary Material, Supplementary Figure 2).  
 
3.3	  Relationship	  between	  TST	  and	  the	  body	  ownership	  illusion	  	  	  
The previous section shows that the change in TST is greater for the C group than for 
the N group. However, we also need to consider the relationship between the 
subjective illusion of body ownership and the TST. Figure 5b shows a positive and 
significant correlation of Q4 (arm) with Δ log t , suggesting that the greater the level of 
perceived ownership of the virtual arm the more impaired is the sensitivity to 
temperature changes.  However, we have seen that condition (N, C) is significantly 
related with Δ log t  and also with the questionnaire responses. So it could be that the 
correlation between Q4 and Δ log t  is spurious. We can test this using path analysis 
(for example, (22)) which can be used to simultaneously model the relationships 
between condition, Q4 and Δ log t . This is shown in Figure 6(a), which has the 
interpretation that the C condition influences Q4 (arm) positively, which in turn 
negatively influences Δ log t . A direct path added from condition to Δ log t  is, 
however, not significant. 
There is also another issue to consider. In (23) it was reported that susceptibility to 
the rubber hand illusion varies with interoceptive sensitivity. It is possible that 
susceptibility to the body ownership illusion considered here may similarly vary with 
exteroceptive (thermal) sensitivity. This does seem to be the case with respect to Q4 
(arm). Figure 5(c) shows the scatter plot of Q4 on log(tReal), demonstrating a 
significant negative slope. There are no significant correlations with the other 
questionnaire variables. This suggests that the greater the exteroceptive (thermal) 
sensitivity the greater the susceptibility to the illusion of owning the virtual arm. 
However, since we have found that log(tReal) is correlated with Q4 and log(tReal) is 
obviously correlated with Δ log t = log(tVR)− log(tReal) , the correlation between Q4 
and Δ log t  may be spurious. Figure 6(b) shows a path diagram that incorporates these 
various possibilities, and the result is that even taking into account these correlations, 
the relationship between Q4 and Δ log t remains significant. 
When Q1 (own) is added into the path diagram then this too is shown to have a 
significant relationship with Δ log t (but not the other two questionnaire variables). 
The value of path analyses in these complex situations is that they support the 
simultaneous modeling of relationships between several variables, through modeling 
the total covariance matrix. In the fit shown in Figure 6(c) condition is significant. 
What is strange, however, is that Q1 (own) is negatively related toΔ log t whereas Q1 
(arm) is positively related.  This led us to suspect that there might be an interaction 
between Q1 and Q4. When Q1×Q4 is added into the model Q1 drops out of 
significance, the coefficient of Q1×Q4 is negative and almost exactly one tenth of the 
coefficient of Q4. This seemed too much of a coincidence given that the range of 
values of the questionnaire variables is from 0 to 10.  
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The above suggested that the variable of interest could be R =Q4 1−Q1/10( ) . 
When this variable is used in the path analysis in place of Q1 and Q4 it simplifies the 
model considerable, since neither log(tReal) nor condition are significantly related to 
R. Hence we are left with three uncorrelated contributions to Δ log t , which are 
condition, log(tReal) and R, whereupon the path analysis becomes equivalent to 
regression analysis. The scatter diagram of Δ log t on R is shown in Figure 5(d), and 
the results of the regression analysis shown in Table 2. In this model condition C has 
a positive influence on Δ log t and so has R. It is remarkable that R, which is of course 
totally constructed out of the subjective questionnaire scores, has almost the same 
influence on Δ log t as log(tReal) (judging by the partial η2  effect sizes), even though 
the latter is bound, by construction, to be strongly correlated.  
It is important to note that the regression equation should not be thought of as a 
normal mathematical equation, i.e., that Δ log t ∝Q4 ⋅(1−Q1/10) , where Q1 and Q4 
are each free to range independently over their possible values (0,1,…,10). In fact Q1 
and Q4 are highly positively correlated (r = 0.66, P < 0.00005), with −3 ≤Q4 −Q1≤ 4
and this must be taken into account in interpretations of the regression result, which is 
discussed below. 
 	  
4.	  DISCUSSION	  
	  
4.1	  The	  Subjective	  Illusion	  of	  Body	  Ownership	  	  
This experiment adds to the literature on the subjective illusion of ownership of a 
virtual body. The results show that it is possible to produce a quite strong subjective 
illusion of ownership of a collocated virtual body that is seen from a first person 
perspective position and in a virtual mirror, where the body is in the same posture and 
the virtual right hand is slaved to the movements of the real right hand. When the 
body posture is not consistent with that of the real body and the movements of the 
virtual right hand are asynchronous and different than those of the real hand then the 
subjective illusion is significantly lower (though not eliminated). 
Various aspects this result have been found before (13, 24). The critical 
importance of 1PP in leading to the full body ownership illusion has been shown, for 
example, in (12, 15) . During the pilot studies it was difficult to find a condition in 
which there was a reduced ownership illusion when there was embodiment with a 
collocated body seen from 1PP. In the study reported in (25) it was found that when 
someone is put virtually in a posture that is not their actual one but where that posture 
is feasible even if uncomfortable, then participants have the illusion of being in that 
posture, even experiencing the discomfort that would normally go with it. In the 
current experiment we found that by having an implausible (but physically realisable) 
body posture and the inconsistent virtual arm movements we were able to attain a 
wide range of ownership questionnaire scores. Even so note that the ranges of body 
illusion questionnaire scores for the Non-Consistent Condition were relatively high 
(Figure 4). In summary - a degree of subjective ownership over a collocated virtual 
body seen from 1PP seems to be the normal response, and not an exceptional one. 
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4.2	  Temperature	  Sensitivity	  as	  a	  Predictor	  of	  Virtual	  Arm	  Ownership	  
 
TST measured prior to entering virtual reality was negatively associated with the 
subjective illusion of ownership over the virtual arm (Figure 5c).  In other words 
greater sensitivity to temperature changes prior to the virtual embodiment (lower 
TST) was associated with a greater subjective illusion of arm ownership. It was 
reported in (23) that susceptibility to the rubber hand illusion increases with lower 
interoceptive sensibility (specifically own heart beat detection). In (26) it was found 
that when participants were asked to pay attention to interoceptive processes (own 
heart beats) they were more likely to report the feeling of touch  in a somatic signal 
detection task, and less likely to report touch when they had been asked to increase 
exteroceptive attention.  In the current experiment participants had been asked to pay 
attention to exteroceptive signals prior to their virtual embodiment, and lower TST 
was associated with higher subjective illusion specifically of the hand of the arm used 
for the temperature sensitivity readings. Putting this together a conjecture would be 
that lower interoceptive sensitivity and higher exteroceptive sensitivity could be 
predictors of the likelihood of the virtual arm illusion. Of course, it is the case that we 
did not attempt to manipulate exteroceptive sensitivity as such, but only attention to 
this, but this conjecture is a reasonable claim from our own results together with these 
two papers.  
 
4.3	  Temperature	  Sensitivity	  Threshold	  and	  Disownership	  
 
In the body ownership literature a drop in surface skin temperature of the 
experimental hand in the context of the RHI has been taken to mean disownership of 
the hand, a corollary of ownership of the rubber hand (17). It might be thought that a 
change in TST on the experimental hand is simply a by-product of that hand’s 
cooling. However, an experiment reported in (27) found almost no correlation 
between thermal threshold and skin temperature when taken over a set of locations on 
the body. Hence changes in TST should be considered as independent of cooling. It is 
possible that TST changes from tReal (before entering the virtual reality) to tVR 
(during the virtual reality) might simply reflect the degree of attention required in the 
two conditions. This is unlikely, however, because the TST readings were taken while 
nothing else was happening, when the participant was told to keep their hand still 
resting on the device while observing their virtual hand. If it were the case that the 
change in TST were due solely to attention we would expect Δ log t  to be the same 
across the two experimental conditions.  
An experimental study reported in (28) found that thermal threshold testing is a 
valid method for assessment of small sensory nerve fibre injury in the hands due to 
vibration induced neuropathy.  There was a significant difference in thermal threshold 
between patients and controls and thermal threshold testing correlated strongly with 
vibration and pain threshold testing, both used in a standard method for assessment of 
this condition. We conclude from this that a change in TST indicates an objective 
recalibration of sensitivity probably across a range of sensations. Now it is a big step 
to associate this recalibration with ‘disownership’, but following the terminology used 
in earlier literature we here cautiously suggest that the term ‘disownership’ also 
include this objective recalibration.  
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4.4	  Temperature	  Sensitivity	  and	  Cross	  Modal	  Congruence	  	  
The fundamental result of this paper is given in Eq. (1)  
 
Δ log t ∝ K1condition + K2Q4 1−
Q1
10
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟ ,K1,K2 > 0
condition = 1,C0,N{
 
………………….…………(1)	  
 
This result shows that the experimental manipulation (condition) did result in 
significantly greater change in TST in the Congruent than in the Non-Congruent 
condition. Moreover, Eq (1) also shows that, other things being equal, the TST 
increases with greater subjective ownership of the virtual arm (Q4). This can be taken 
as analogous to the finding in (17) of a temperature drop in the experimental arm in 
the RHI and correlated with subjective strength of the illusion, but an independent 
result due to the lack of correlation between thermal sensitivity and skin temperature 
(27). 
In (29) evidence was presented that the result found in (17) of a decrease in 
temperature of the experimental arm may have been solely due to cross-modal 
incongruence rather than the subjective illusion of rubber hand ownership. The 
experiment reported in this paper is consistent with this in the thermal threshold 
domain since the finding is clear that the consistent condition is associated with 
higher threshold. However, the results are also consistent with (17) since the path 
analysis showed that even allowing for a direct effect of the experimental condition 
on the threshold change there is an effect of the subjective illusion of arm ownership. 
Another way to see this is that the two terms on the right hand side of Eq (1) are 
uncorrelated, so that their contribution to the response on the left hand side can be 
considered as separate. 
Eq (1) suggests that the full body ownership illusion (Q1) modulates the impact of 
the virtual arm ownership illusion (Q4) on the TST change. When whole body 
ownership (Q1) is high then there is little or no effect of the arm illusion (Q4) on the 
TST change. Q4 is only associated with a positive change in TST (less sensitivity) 
when the overall body ownership illusion is low, and the lower it is the greater the 
possible contribution. However, bearing in mind that Q1 and Q4 are correlated, even 
when Q1=0, Q4≤ 4, so that low levels of body ownership are also associated with low 
arm ownership.  Our interpretation of these findings is that if the ownership illusion is 
very strong, then since the virtual body is coincident with the real body, there is no 
substantive change in the relationship with the ‘owned’ body. It is where it is 
normally supposed to be - only its façade has changed.  
How does this relate to the issue of ‘ownership’ and ‘disownership’ in the context 
of these illusions? We believe our data support the notion that when there is a whole 
body ownership illusion, in the context of a virtual body substituting the real body and 
seen from first person perspective, that the virtual body and real counterpart become 
unified in one overall body representation. There is no disownership of the real body 
in this case, but rather the real and virtual body become one. The participant moves 
his body and sees the virtual body move correspondingly and similar to how she or he 
has moved and seen the real body move throughout life. The proprioception and 
associated tactile sensations due to movement (e.g., brushing of clothing against the 
skin) of course arise from the real body. However, the visual body is the virtual one. 
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Hence the real body is providing the sensory data that is unified with the visual virtual 
body. In this case there is no cross modal conflict between real and virtual body but 
rather they become a unified totality. There is no disownership of the real body or of 
the real hand in this case, but rather there is a ‘gestalt’ that integrates all. 
The 1PP with respect to a virtual body that substitutes the own is critical in this. 
This was shown in its most extreme form in (30) for the whole body: when the visual 
centre of awareness of participants was located outside of their own body it was 
perceived as not being part of themselves and subjectively disowned. There is further 
evidence of this in (18) where it is shown that when the virtual body is seen from 3PP 
then there is also a reduction in temperature at different points on the body, akin to 
(17).   
These ideas fit well with the notion of a ‘body matrix’ representation in the brain 
that integrates visual, proprioceptive and tactile input, and personal and near 
surrounding space (peripersonal space), from a body centred reference frame (20). 
This body matrix maintains the psychological integrity of the body and interrelates 
perceptual, and cognitive representations and homeostatic controls. We propose that 
this includes sensitivity to skin-contact surface temperature change, and in all 
likelihood to other aspects of sensitivity such as tactile, vibrational and pain 
thresholds.  
The body matrix also can accommodate changes to the body structure, by 
integrating sensory data that provides evidence for such changes. For example, when 
the body appears to have changed, and when the evidence of this change is provided 
through consistent multisensory data pointing to a new interpretation of body 
structure, then the body matrix propagates the change to all levels - perceptual, 
cognitive, personal and peripersonal space, regulatory function and protection 
mechanisms. Therefore we propose that the body matrix has a hierarchical structure, 
where global body ownership is at the top level, and changes at this level ripple 
through all lower levels of the hierarchy. It has been shown that neural activation 
associated with whole body ownership is triggered through the stimulation of 
ownership of individual body parts (31). Also it was found in (32) that there is a part-
whole relationship with respect to the hand - for example, a synchronously stimulated 
finger carried with it ownership of a nearby unstimulated finger, but not an 
asynchronously stimulated nearby finger. Our model suggests that ownership can also 
be inherited from the top down, that subjective global body ownership is correlated 
with arm ownership, and that when global ownership is high then there is no 
disownership of the hand, rather it is integrated into an overall body matrix. In this 
case the hand ‘inherits’ via the body matrix all the aspects normally associated with 
ownership, which do not differ from ownership of the physical body. It is important to 
realise that in the experiment of (31) participants already saw the whole manikin 
body. Thus while it may be the case that ownership of the whole body comes from the 
integration of body parts, it could also be the case that the 1PP view of the whole 
body (or whole hand) is already enough to integrate body parts lower down in the 
hierarchy (provided that there is no disruptive cross modal stimulation of those parts). 
An example of the ripple effect from global ownership of the whole virtual body  
can be found in the long arm illusion (10) where, from first person perspective of a 
full virtual body, one arm was seen to be abnormally long, but displayed with  
visuomotor and visuotactile synchrony. When the hand of the arm was threatened 
there was a defensive movement as if the real hand had been threatened. It may even 
be the case that changes to the body are propagated through the body matrix to 
concomitant cognitive and behavioural changes that ‘fit’ the changed body. For 
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example, it has been shown (in a between groups experiment where each participant 
was exposed to only one type of body) that when people are virtually embodied in a 
casually dressed dark skinned body they play an African hand drum with significantly 
greater body movement than when they are embodied in a formally dressed light 
skinned body (33). Moreover the degree of objective difference in their drumming 
movement correlates with their level of subjective body ownership over the respective 
virtual body. The higher body ownership the greater the difference between the 
movement involved in drum playing in the two bodies. 
With regard to disownership of the real counterpart of the newly owned body part 
the authors of (20) argue that there are two possibilities (in the context of the rubber 
hand illusion): either “(1) The rubber hand and the actual hand become unified, that 
is, there is some sense of disownership of the intact, actual hand; or else (2) … the 
dominant hand representation simply extinguishes the other representation …”. We 
believe that there is a third possibility - which is that the rubber hand and real hand 
could become integrated but with each providing part of the information of a unified 
whole (the real hand the proprioceptive and tactile data and the rubber hand the visual 
data). The real hand is not disowned but becomes part of the new unified entity, the 
real/rubber hand. On this matter we note that all previous discussions of disownership 
have been with respect to a body part that is static during the experiment - an 
immobile surrogate hand. In our case the real experimental hand was moved by the 
participant, who saw (in the C condition) corresponding movement of the virtual arm 
and hand. Hence there was a rich array of additional motor, proprioceptive and tactile 
sensations that is not present in the rubber hand illusion, data that can be unified with 
the visual representation thus providing an overall unified owned entity, without the 
disownership of the experimental hand. 
The body matrix plays a critical role in determining whether there will be this new 
unified entity without disownership of the experimental hand. If we consider the 
standard RHI setup, prior to the onset of the illusion there is of course a body matrix 
representation, which incorporates the owned experimental hand but not the rubber 
hand. Through multisensory stimulation, the body matrix is updated and has to 
actively incorporate the rubber hand, and the evidence suggests disown the 
experimental hand. This appears to be the case even when the surrogate hand and real 
hand are apparently co-located (34). However, in the case of embodiment in virtual 
reality, the participant enters the VR, sees from 1PP the virtual body replacing the real 
one - both directly by looking down towards it, and indirectly through mirror 
reflections (as in Figure 2). In this case already the body matrix is updated so that the 
virtual body is unified with the real body in one overall new encompassing body 
representation. The moving hand therefore does not have to be additionally 
incorporated - it already is so. For some individuals, even the non-congruent 
condition was enough to generate the illusion of body ownership thus updating the 
body matrix, so that large discrepancies between the position and movement of the 
virtual hand compared to the real were tolerated. This is analogous to (12) where it 
was shown that when there is a full body ownership illusion (through 1PP with 
respect to a virtual body that substitutes the real one) even asynchronous visuotactile 
stimulation was not perceived incorrect. But where there is a low level of body 
ownership, the body matrix remains associated with the real body so that, as in the 
RHI, the virtual arm has to be incorporated. This requires additional resources to 
accomplish, possibly even attentional resources, thus leading to ‘disownership’ of the 
experimental arm.  
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To conclude then we believe that the overall message of the study is that the full 
body ownership illusion drives the body matrix. When there is such a body ownership 
illusion this is propagated to many different systems in the body matrix and there is in 
this case no contradiction to be resolved between the real and the virtual body. They 
become one overall entity - forming the body representation of the individual. When 
there is not a full body ownership illusion then the ‘normal’ body matrix must be 
extended to incorporate alien body parts - but at the expense of disownership of the 
corresponding real body parts. We assert that the full body ownership illusion in 
virtual reality is attained by virtually replacing the real body by the virtual body, and 
where the participant sees this virtual body from the viewpoint of where its eyes 
should be. If the participant is not allowed to move his or her limbs (except the head 
in order to look around) then this is already a sufficient condition (12). If, however, 
the participant is able to move (limbs and trunk) then a further requirement is that the 
virtual body must be seen to move correspondingly and synchronously in real-time.   
Our final point is that in our experiment there was an asymmetry between results 
of the first and second trials, leading us to treat this as a between-groups experiment 
using only the first trial. In Electronic Supplementary Material we provide an analysis 
of the within groups setup and explain why there was this substantial asymmetry. The 
evidence suggests that this problem might apply to similar experiments reported in the 
literature. It should be a norm in this research field that when within-groups 
experimental designs are employed that authors report on the issue of trial-to-trial 
symmetry.  
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TABLES	  	  	  
Table	  1	  The	  Post	  Experience	  Questionnaire	  	  NOT	  AT	  ALL	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  0	   	  	  1	  	  2	  	  3	  	  4	  	  5	  	  6	  	  7	  	  8	  	  9	  	  	  	   10	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  VERY	  MUCH	  	  	   Q1.	  (own)	  How	  much	  did	  you	  feel	  that	  the	  virtual	  body	  was	  your	  body?	  	  	  Q2.	  (move)	  How	  much	  did	  you	  feel	  that	  the	  movements	  that	  the	  virtual	  body	  made	  were	  your	  movements?	  	  	  Q3.	   (another)	   How	   much	   did	   you	   feel	   that	   the	   virtual	   body	   was	   another	  person?	  	  Q4.	  (arm)	  How	  much	  did	  you	  feel	  the	  virtual	  arm	  belonged	  to	  you?	  	  	   	  	  
Table	  2	  Regression	  Analysis	  for	  Δ log t 	  n	  =	  40,	  F(3,36)	  =	  12.43,	  P	  <	  0.00005,	  R2	  =	  	  0.51	  	  
Variable	   Coefficient S.E. t P Partial η2 Constant	   -0.45	   0.13	   -3.40	   0.002	   	  log(tReal)	   -0.31	   0.10	   -3.11	   0.004	   0.21	  Condition(N=0,	  C=1)	   0.31	   0.11	   2.78	   0.009	   0.18	  
R =Q4 1−Q1/10( ) 	   0.15	   0.05	   2.94	   0.006	   0.19	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FIGURE	  CAPTIONS	  	  Figure	   1.	   The	   Case	   IV	   temperature	   sensitivity	   recording	   device,	   and	   its	   virtual	  counterpart.	  (a)	  Shows	  the	  position	  of	  the	  participant	  next	  to	  the	  device	  (b)	  the	  view	  in	  the	  virtual	  mirror.	   	  The	  real	  device	  and	  virtual	  counterpart	  are	  covered	  with	  a	  green	  cloth.	  	  Figure	  2.	  First	  person	  perspective	  of	  the	  body	  and	  the	  view	  in	  the	  virtual	  mirror	  (a)	  a	  stereo	  pair	  of	  the	  scene	  when	  the	  participant	  looks	  down	  towards	  himself	  (b)	   the	  participant	  moving	  an	  arm	  (c)	  a	  view	   in	   the	  mirror	  of	  arm	  movements.	  (b)	  and	  (c)	  are	  not	  meant	  to	  be	  corresponding	  images.	  	  Figure	  3.	  Contrasting	  the	  C	  and	  N	  conditions.	  The	  inset	  shows	  an	  example	  of	  the	  N	  Condition,	  where	   the	   avatar	   is	   in	   a	   strange	  posture,	   and	   the	  virtual	   and	   real	  hand	  movements	  and	  position	  do	  not	  match.	  The	  right	  image	  shows	  a	  snapshot	  from	   the	  Consistent	   condition,	  where	   the	   character	   is	   seated	  normally	   and	   the	  real	  and	  virtual	  hand	  movement	  match.	  In	  the	  N	  condition	  the	  position	  of	  the	  real	  hand	  did	  not	  correspond	  with	  the	  position	  of	  the	  virtual	  hand,	  whereas	  it	  did	  in	  the	  C	  condition.	  	  Figure	  4.	  Boxplots	  for	  the	  questionnaire	  scores	  for	  condition	  N	  and	  C.	  The	  central	  horizontal	  lines	  are	  the	  medians	  and	  the	  upper	  and	  lower	  edges	  of	  the	  boxes	  are	  the	  25	  and	  75	  percentiles.	  The	  whiskers	  extend	  to	  the	  minimum	  and	  maximum	  data	  points	  if	  these	  are	  not	  outliers.	  Outliers	  are	  shown	  separately	  and	  are	  outside	  the	  bounds	  of	  1.5	  times	  the	  interquartile	  range	  below	  or	  above	  the	  25	  and	  75	  percentiles	  respectively.	  In	  this	  case	  the	  length	  of	  the	  whisker	  extends	  to	  1.5	  times	  the	  interquartile	  range.	  	  Figure	  5.	  Scatter	  plots	   for	  TST	  and	  questionnaire	  responses.	   (a)	   	  Scatter	  plot	  of	  
tVR	  by	  tReal	  on	  the	  log	  scale,	  with	  regression	  lines	  for	  analysis	  of	  covariance	  with	  Condition	   as	   the	   co-­‐variate.	   Here	   R2	   =	   0.49,	   and	   the	   significance	   levels	   for	   the	  slope	  and	  intercept	  are	  P	  <	  0.0005	  and	  P	  =	  0.02	  respectively.	  (b)	  Scatter	  diagram	  of	   Δ log t on	   Q4	   (arm);	   R2	   =	   0.23,	   P	   <	   0.002.	   (c)	   Scatter	   diagram	   of	   Q4	   on	  log(tReal);	  R2	  	  =	  0.16,	  P	  =	  0.011.	  (d)	  Scatter	  plot	  of	   Δ log t on	  R	  =	  Q4*(1-­‐Q1/10)	  by	  condition;	  R2	  =	  0.38,	  significance	  levels	  for	  slope	  and	  intercept	  are	  P	  =	  0.001	  and	  P	  =	  0.003	  respectively.	   	  All	  tests	  satisfy	  normality	  requirements	  on	  the	  residual	  errors	  of	  the	  corresponding	  regression	  equation	  using	  the	  Shapiro-­‐Wilks	  test	  (all	  P	  for	  residual	  errors	  compatible	  with	  a	  normal	  distribution	  P	  >	  0.12).	  	  	  Figure	  6.	  Path	  diagrams	  for	  decomposition	  of	  influences	  on	  Δ log t 	  and	  R.	  (a)Path	  analysis	  for	   Δ log t on	  condition	  and	  Q4.	  (b)	  Path	  analysis	  for	  Δ log t including	  the	  effect	  of	  log(tReal).	  (c)	  Full	  path	  analysis.	  The	  path	  analyses	  use	  the	  asymptotic	  distribution	  free	  method	  for	  estimation	  and	  significance	  testing	  (and	  hence	  do	  not	  rely	  on	  multivariate	  normal	  assumptions).	  The	  annotations	  on	  the	  path	  lines	  indicate	  the	  path	  coefficient	  (with	  the	  corresponding	  significance	  level	  in	  brackets).	  The	  curved	  path	  represents	  the	  inclusion	  of	  a	  covariance	  term	  between	  the	  connected	  items.	  	  
